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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Subject to exceptions not applicable herein, § 621 of the 
California Evidence Code establishes a conclusive pre-
sumption of paternity in the husband of a mother whose 
child was born in wedlock. The question presented is 
whether § 621 violates the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
operates to deny a hearing to a child's biological father 
and thereby to terminate his parental rights although he 
has demonstrated "a full commitment to the responsibili-
ties of parenthood by 'comfing] forward to participate in 
the rearing of his child.'" Lehr V. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248,261 (1983). 
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JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California, 
denying appellants' petition for review, was filed on July 
30, 1987. A notice of appeal to this Court was duly filed 
in the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, 
of California, on October 28, 1987. This appeal was 
docketed in this Court on October 28, 1987, within 90 
days of the judgment below. 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may be applicable 
to this appeal. 
Probable jurisdiction was noted on February 29, 1988. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
This case involves the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. This case also involves Cali-
fornia Evidence Code § 621. These provisions are set 
forth at J.S. 2-4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE * 
In 1978, Michael H. and Carole D. were neighbors in 
Playa del Rey, California. Carole had been married to 
Gerald D. since 1976. In the summer of 1978, Carole and 
Michael began an extramarital affair which continued 
until October 1980, when Gerald moved to New York 
and Carole left Los Angeles for a sojourn in Paris. A. 1, 
43, 73-74.2 Soon after Carole arrived in Paris, she called 
1
 Because the case was dismissed before any evidentiary hearing 
was permitted, and before Michael II. was allowed to introduce 
in court any evidence in support of his position, the record is 
necessarily limited to the undisputed facts noted in the court's 
opinion, by the affidavits of the parties and the report of the ap-
pointed expert. 
2
 "A." refers to the record Appendix in this Court. 
Michael, told him that she wras pregnant with his chil 
and that she intended to abort the fetus. Michael aske 
Carole to reconsider her decision, asking that she divorc 
Gerald, marry him and have the child. Subsequent) 
Carole wrote Michael that she had had an abortion o 
October 31, 1980. In January of 1981, Carole calle 
Michael to inform him that she had been pregnant wit 
twins, that the abortion had terminated only one of th 
fetuses and that she was five months pregnant with th 
remaining fetus.3 A. 75. 
Following this, Gerald returned to Los Angeles an 
reunited with Carole. Victoria D. was born on May 11 
1981. Carole called Michael to inform him of the birtl 
In September of 1981, Gerald and Carole separate* 
again. A. 77. In the following month, Carole, Michae 
and Victoria w-ent to a clinic at the University of Cali 
fornia at Los Angeles for a Human Leukocyte Antigei 
(HLA) test to determine the child's biological paternity 
The test showed a 98.07% probability that Michael wa 
Victoria's biological father. A. 10, 77. From that poin 
on, Michael has continually, with enormous persistenc 
and at great personal expense, sought to establish am 
maintain his parental relationship with Victoria. He ha 
fed and housed both Carole and Victoria and, indeed, ha 
provided financial support to Carole and the child evei 
when they were not living under his roof. His love fo 
and attention to Victoria has been constant and unswerv 
ing, and he has availed himself of every opportunity t 
provide her with warmth, comfort and parental involve 
ment. 
In January 1982, Carole and Victoria moved to St 
Thomas to live with Michael. A. 44. They leased a hous< 
together; Carole signed the lease as "Carole Hirschen 
9
 Because Michael had a child by a previous marriage with ; 
serious genetic disorder causing profound retardation, called Law 
rence-Moon Beidel syndrome, he and Carole consulted the Geneti 
Clinic at the University of Southern California. A. 76. 
4 
son"; she held Michael out as Victoria's father, and the 
three lived together as a family unit. In March 1982, 
Carole took Victoria to Los Angeles for a visit, promising 
to return to Michael. A. 78. Instead, for approximately 
the following year, Carole lived with a new boyfriend, 
Scott K., and then returned again to Gerald. A. 44, 78. 
In the fall of 1982, Michael came to Los Angeles to 
visit Victoria. Carole then attempted to restrict his 
visits with the child and, in November 1982, Michael 
filed the filiation suit that has led to this appeal. A. 78. 
On April 12, 1983, a guardian ad litem was appointed 
for Victoria.4 J.S.S. 6. 
In July 1983, Carole, having separated again from 
Gerald—who returned to New York—invited Michael to 
live with her and Victoria in Los Angeles. A. 79. The 
three resumed living together as a family in August 
1983. Carole told her friends and family that Michael 
was Victoria's father and encouraged Victoria to call 
Michael "Daddy", a term the child used regularly. A. 79; 
J.S. B4. Michael supported Carole and Victoria and 
maintained a joint bank account with Carole. A. 79. 
During this period, Michael and Victoria developed a 
warm, close and loving parent-child relationship. 
In March 1984, Michael and Carole agreed to a Stipu-
lation intended to resolve the then-pending filiation suit. 
A. 83. As of that time, Gerald had never sought to in-
tervene in the suit to take a position as to his paternity. 
The Stipulation, signed by Carole and Michael,6 acknowl-
edged Michael's paternity, obligated him for continuing 
financial support and made Victoria his sole heir. In the 
4
 Throughout this litigation, the guardian ad litem, who has been 
independent of all the other adults in the case, has consistently 
taken the position that a de facto father-child relationship existed 
between Victoria and Michael which it was in Victoria's best inter-
est to preserve. J.S. B6. 
5
 Carole later instructed her attorney not to file the Stipulation 
in court. J.S. B4. 
u 
following month Carole decided to end her relationsh: 
with Michael. A. 83. 
Following Carole's decision to leave Michael, both Vi 
toria's guardian ad litem and Michael sought penden 
lite visitation between Michael and Victoria. The S 
perior Court appointed a psychologist to evaluate tl 
parties and submit a recommendation. J.S.S. 11. The e 
pert administered a battery of psychological tests 
Michael, Carole, Victoria and Gerald, spent hours inte 
viewing each of them and observing their interactior 
and submitted a 20-page report. A. 41. The report, 
essence, concluded that the child was positively attach* 
to all three parental figures, "principally and equalh 
(emphasis in original) to Michael and Carole. A. 48. T 
report recognized the importance to the child th 
Michael remain a part of her family because "[the ev* 
uators] perceived Michael H. as the single adult in Vi 
toria D.'s life most committed to caring for her needs < 
a long-term basis." A. 51. The report also comment 
on the beneficial nature to Victoria of a relationship wi 
Michael, noting that "it would be unnecessarily hurti 
to deprive her of his affection and intellectual stimul 
tion." A. 52. It further addressed the "strong positi 
mutual attachment" between Michael and the child ai 
Victoria's attitude of "warmth and comfort" toward hi 
A. 63. Following the submission of the report, the parti 
entered into a stipulated resolution of the pendente I 
visitation issue which was entered as an order on Oc 
ber 13, 1984. J.S. B5. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On November 18, 1982, Michael H. initiated this acti 
in California Superior Court against Gerald D., Car 
D. and Victoria D. to declare his paternity of Victoria 
As noted supra, the trial court appointed a guardian 
litem/attorney to represent the interests of Victoria 
and the guardian ad litem thereupon filed a cross-cc 
plaint against Michael H., Gerald D. and Carole D. seek-
ing a declaration of a legal or de facto parent-child 
relationship between Victoria D. and Michael H. 
Following the submission of the report of the court-
appointed psychologist and a stipulation among the par-
ties to a visitation schedule, Gerald D. filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment predicated on the absolute bar im-
posed by the conclusive presumption of section 621 of 
the California Evidence Code. Appellants opposed the 
motion on the ground that section 621 was unconstitu-
tional as repugnant to the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. On January 28, 1985, 
the trial court granted the motion for summary judg-
ment, dismissing Michael H.'s Petition for Declaration of 
Paternity and the guardian ad litem's request for decla-
ration of a parent-child relationship without an eviden-
tiary hearing on any issue. 
The due process and equal protection challenges were 
made again on appeal to the Court of Appeal of the 
State of California, Second District, Division Three. The 
constitutional claims were squarely decided by that court 
in affirming the Judgment of the Superior Court. J.S. 
B14-B18. 
A Petition for Hearing was thereafter timely filed 
with the Supreme Court of California reiterating appel-
lants' constitutional claims. The California Supreme 
Court denied appellant's petition for review on July 
30, 1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court has in four cases considered the extent 
to which a natural father's biological relationship with 
his child is entitled to protection under the Due Process 
Clause, even if the child is not the product of a marital 
union. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin 
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) ; Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983). The basic principle enunciated by the Court is 
that if an unwed father has demonstrated a full commit-
ment to his paternity by accepting its burdens, has de-
veloped a relationship with his child, and has cared for 
the child in the manner expected of a parent—by assum-
ing financial, personal or custodial responsibilities—the 
Constitution recognizes that he has a "liberty" interest 
in his relationship to his child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-
262; Caban, 441 U.S. at 389, n.7; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 
255; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-652. 
In this case, Appellant Michael H. has amply demon-
strated a full parental commitment to bis child and has 
thereby "developed [a] parent-child relationship [as] was 
implicated in Stanley, and Caban." See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 
621. Accordingly, he should be deemed to have a funda-
mental "liberty" interest entitling him to protection under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and deserving of respect in determining his rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
II.A. Section 621 of the California Evidence Code de-
clares that "the issue of a wife cohabiting with her 
husband * * * is conclusively presumed to be a child of 
the marriage." The only exceptions provided for therein 
are where the husband is impotent or sterile, and where 
the husband (alone), or the wife, together with the 
father, petition for a blood test to establish paternity 
within two years of the birth of the child. 
In a case such as this, where a putative biological father 
who is not the mother's husband has established a pa-
rental relationship in the ways contemplated by Lehr and 
its antecedents, the statute extinguishes that father's 
liberty interests, not on the merits after a full hearing 
and careful consideration of all the interests affected, but 
by the legal fiction of conclusive presumption. It thereby 
denies such a father "due process of law—using that term 
in its primary sense of an opportunity to be heard, and 
to defend [his] substantitve rights". Brinkerhoff-Faris 
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930) 
^ 
8 
(Brandeis, J . ) . A corollary of this constitutional require-
ment is "that a statute creating a presumption which op-
erates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). Accordingly, 
in Stanley v. Illinois, supra, this Court held that a father 
had been deprived of his liberty interest "in children he 
has sired and raised" (405 U.S. at 651) without due 
process by Illinois' irrebuttable statutory presumption 
that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their 
children, whereby the state took custody of the children 
on the death of the mother without providing any hear-
ing on the father's parental fitness. The fact conclusively 
presumed by § 621 is no more "necessarily or universally 
true" (Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452) than the presumptions 
which were struck down in Stanley and Vlandis; nor, 
given present-day technology, is the state without "rea-
sonable alternative means" (id.) for determining the 
identity of the actual father. Thus, by denying the bio-
logical father his liberty interest and "companionship, 
care, custody, and management" of his child (Stanley, 
405 U.S. at 651) without a hearing, § 621 unconstitution-
ally deprives him of due process of law. See also Lassiter 
v. Department of Social Service, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (each of which decides that 
a parent may not be divested of his or her rights as 
such without a hearing). 
B. The court below sought to support the constitu-
tionality of § 621 and its application in this case on the 
basis that the "conclusive presumption is actually a sub-
stantive rule of law * * V J.S. Bl l , citing Kusior v. 
Silver, 55 Cal.2d 603, 619, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 140, 354 
P.2d 657, 668 (1960). On this view, the Court balanced 
appellant's right to a hearing against the state interests 
which were said to be served by § 621. This was funda-
mental error. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 452 
U.S. 422 (1982), the Court reiterated that "it has become 
a truism that 'some form of hearing' is required before 
the owner is finally deprived of a protected property [or 
liberty] interest". (Id. at 433, quoting Board of Regents 
V. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-571, n.8 (1972) (emphasis in 
Roth)). Under the Due Process Clause, that right is not 
subject to being balanced away. "On the other hand," 
said the Court, "the timing and nature of the required 
hearing 'will depend on appropriate accommodation of 
the competing interests involved'." 455 U.S. at 434, quot-
ing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 
Without a hearing, it cannot be determined whether 
the state interest which § 621 assertedly serves would in 
fact be adversely affected by recognizing the father's pa-
ternity and his parental rights. For example, the state's 
interest "in the integrity of the family unit," J.S. Bl l , 
B15-B16, is in fact furthered only if a stable family 
consisting of the child, the mother and the husband exists 
in fact. Its existence may not be presumed, since it is 
far from universally true that such a family is stable 
where the mother has had a child with a man other than 
the husband, and the biological father has assumed and 
exercised responsibility for the care of the child sufficient 
to establish a liberty interest in his relationship with 
the child. So too, there must be a hearing to ascertain 
whether the liberty interest and the state interest can 
be accommodated, for example, by recognizing the true 
father's paternity and according him visitational rights. 
Likewise, without a hearing a court cannot know whether 
the state's unquestionable interest in the welfare of the 
child would be advanced or hindered by terminating its 
relationship with its father. Nevertheless, as construed 
below, § 621 categorically overrides the father's liberty 
interest in his relationship with his child without re-
gard to what a hearing would show as to whether these 
assertedly countervailing state interests are truly impli-
cated, and if so, how these interests and that of the 
father can best be effectuated. 
* 
III. Appellant was also denied his rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause by the operation of § 621. Be-
cause § 621 denies appellant and other fathers similarly 
situated a hearing in which they can establish their 
paternity and their parental rights, it is indistinguish-
able from the statute which was held in Stanley v. Il-
linois to be "inescapably contrary to the Equal Protec-
tion Clause", 405 U.S. at 658. Moreover, like the statute 
which was struck down in Caban v. Mohammed on equal 
protection grounds, § 621 unjustifiably discriminates be-
tween biological parents. Under its terms, the right of a 
biological mother to remain a parent is never open to 
question without access to a full panoply of due process 
protections, whereas a biological father may be deprived 
of parental rights without any determinations as to his 
fitness or otherwise. 
Section 621 cannot survive scrutiny under the standard 
of Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978): "When 
a statutory classification significantly interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld un-
less it is supported by sufficiently important state inter-
ests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those inter-
ests." For, by depriving the father of his liberty in-
terest without a hearing, § 621 cuts off at the thresh-
hold all inquiry as to whether that harsh result is realis-
tically necessary to effectuate any important state in-
terest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Appellant's Demonstrated Parental Commitment 
His Child Establishes a "Liberty" Interest Entitled 
Constitutional Protections 
In determining whether a person's rights to du 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment have been ir 
fringed upon, the first inquiry is whether the interes 
infringed upon is of the sort which is entitled to cor 
stitutional protection. "[T]o determine whether du 
process requirements apply in the first place, we mm 
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the intere< 
at stake. . . . We must look to see if the interest i 
within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of libert 
and property." Smith v. Organization of Foster Fan 
Hies, 431 U.S. 816, 841 (1977) (quoting Board of Hi 
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-571 (1972) (emphasi 
in original)). 
This Court has in four cases considered the extent t 
which a natural father's biological relationship with h 
child is entitled to protection under the Due Proce; 
Clause, even if the child is not the product of a marit 
union. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ; Quilloi 
V. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammn 
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr V. Robertson, 463 U.S. 21 
(1983). Lehr distilled the teachings of the earlier dec 
sions to set forth the following test: 
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commi 
ment to the responsibilities of parenthood I 
"com Ting] forward to participate in the rearing < 
his child," Caban, 441 U.S., at 392, his interest i 
personal contact with his child acquires substanti; 
protection under the Due Process Clause. At th; 
point it may be said that he "act[s] as a fa the 
toward his children." Id., at 389, n.7. But the mei 
existence of a biological link does not merit equ 
valent constitutional protection. The actions < 
judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds. "fTll 
importance of the familial relationship, to the ii 
dividuals involved and to the society, stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy 
of daily association, and from the role it plays in 
*promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction 
of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood 
relationship." Smith V. Organization of Foster Fam-
ilies for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 
(1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
231-233 (1972)). [463 U.S. at 261.] 
The test is practical and rooted in the realities—the bur-
dens and the joys—of the parent-child relationship.6 The 
Court explained: 
The significance of the biological connection is that 
it offers the natural father an opportunity that no 
other male possesses to develop a relationship with 
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and 
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's 
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship and make uniquely valuable contribu-
tions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, 
the Federal Constitution will not automatically com-
pel a State to listen to his opinion of where the 
child's best interests lie. [Id. at 262 (footnote 
omitted).] 
In fact, the basic principle enunciated by the Court is 
that if an unwed father has demonstrated a full commit-
ment to his paternity by accepting its burdens, has de-
veloped a relationship with his child, has cared for the 
child in the manner expected of a parent—by assuming 
financial, personal or custodial responsibilities—the Con-
stitution recognizes that he has a "liberty" interest in 
his relationship to his child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-262; 
Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 & n.7; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; 
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-652.7 
• The Court's thesis is reminiscent of Samuel Clemens' observa-
tion: "A baby is an inestimable blessing and bother." Letter to 
Annie Webster, September 1, 1876. 
1
 See also Rivera v. Minnich, U.S. , n.7, 107 
S.Ct. 3001, 3004 n.7 (1987) (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261). 
In this case there is a "developed parent-child relatioi 
ship [as] was implicated in Stanley and Caban." Se 
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.8 Appellant Michael H. hs 
amply demonstrated a full parental commitment to h 
child. Michael H. (a) filed a timely petition for declan 
tion of paternity 18 months after the birth of the chil< 
as soon as it became clear that the mother did not inten 
to acknowledge his paternity and might otherwise intei 
fere with his relationship with Victoria; (b) was tl 
de facto father of the child in a family unit during t\ 
periods Carole D. lived with him; (c) contributed final 
cially to the child and mother on a regular and ongoir 
basis; (d) agreed to acknowledge the child as his so 
heir; and (e) developed a warm and supportive parent; 
relationship with his offspring both during the time 1 
acted as de facto father and during his regular perioc 
of visitation.9 
The report of a court-appointed expert, moreove 
demonstrates that Michael H. and his daughter had a 
actual relationship as warm, as tender, as supports 
and as important to the child's development as any oth( 
parental relationship to which Victoria was exposei 
Indeed, that report stressed the importance of extendir 
8
 In Stanley the Court stated: "The private interest here, th 
of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniab 
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interej 
protection." 405 U.S. at 651. 
9
 This case, therefore, differs from the mere "potential relatio 
ship involved in Quilloin" See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. There, tl 
natural father waited 11 years before filing a petition for legitim 
tion, and "never exercised actual or legal custody over his chil 
and * * * never shouldered any significant responsibility with r 
spect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of tl 
child." 434 U.S. at 256. Appellant's situation is also unlike that 
Lehr, where the natural father failed to establish "any significai 
custodial, personal, or financial relationship" with his child, 463 U. 
at 262, and the majority concluded that the State had "adequate 
protected his opportunity to form such a relationship." Id. at 2( 
u 
formal parental recognition to Michael H. because it was 
in the child's best interest to maintain her relationship 
with "the single adult * * * most committed to caring 
for her needs on a long-term basis.,, J.S. B5; A. 51. 
Accordingly, under this Court's precedents, Michael H. 
should be deemed to have a fundamental "liberty" inter-
est entitling him to constitutional protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II. The California Statute Violates the Due Process Clause 
Because It Deprives Petitioner of His Liberty Interest 
Without a Hearing 
A. Appellant Michael H. has been denied the oppor-
tunity to establish that he is the biological father of Vic-
toria and to vindicate his liberty interest as a biological 
father who has "demonstrate [d] a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood," Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. 
at 621, by operation of § 621 of the California Evidence 
Code. In terms, § 621 declares that "the issue of a wife 
cohabiting with her husband * # * is conclusively pre-
sumed to be a child of the marriage." In a case such as 
this, where a putative biological father, who is not the 
mother's husband, has established a parental relationship 
in the ways contemplated by Stanley, Quilloin, Caban and 
Lehr, the statute estinguishes that putative biological 
father's liberty interests, not on the merits after a full 
hearing and careful consideration of all the interests 
implicated, but by the legal fiction of conclusive presump-
tion. 
The foregoing presumption is, however, subject to cer-
tain exceptions. The first is that the conclusive pre-
sumption is not applicable where the husband is "impotent 
or sterile." Id. Additionally, pursuant to amendments 
adopted in 1980 and 1981,JO the conclusive presumption is 
™ See Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal.3d 461, 465, 198 Cal.Rptr. 543, 
546, 674 P.2d 245, 248, appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 967 (1984). 
not applicable, and the husband's paternity may be chal-
lenged by blood-test evidence (§ 621(b)) in two circum-
stances—by the husband (§ 621(c)); and by the mother 
if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with 
the court acknowledging paternity of the child (§621 
(d ) ) . n Thus, the husband may raise the question of 
paternity alone, but neither the mother nor the biological 
father may do so except jointly. 
By denying him a hearing to establish and effectuate 
his liberty interest in his relationship with his daughter, 
California has denied to appellant "due process of law— 
using that term in its primary sense of an opportunity to 
be heard and to defend [his] substantive right." Brinker-
hoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. V. HUl, 281 U.S. 673, 678 
(1930) (Brandeis, J . ) . "Before a person is deprived of a 
interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind 
of a hearing * * *," Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 570 n.7 (1972), because "the right to be heard before 
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind * # * 
is a principle basic to our society." Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In short, "[a] funda-
mental requirement of due process is 'the opportunity to 
be heard.'" Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 
(1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 
(1914)). 
One corollary of this constitutional principle is "that a 
statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a 
fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441, 446 (1973). In Vlandis, the Court declared 
unconstitutional, under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute mandating an 
11
 Such a challenge would be brought on by notice of motion for 
blood tests which must, under both (c) and (d), be raised not 
later than two years after the child's birth. 
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for the pur-
poses of qualifying for reduced tuition rates at a state 
university. The Court said : 
[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny 
an individual the resident rates on the basis of a 
permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresi-
dence, when that presumption is not necessarily or 
universally true in fact, and when the State has rea-
sonable alternative means of making the crucial 
determination. [412 U.S. at 452.] 
Vlandis followed, among other precedents (see 412 U.S. 
at 446-447), Stanley v. Illinois, supra. In Stanley, after 
holding that a man has a liberty interest "in the children 
he has sired and raised," 405 U.S. at 651, this Court went 
on to decide that Stanley had been deprived of that inter-
est without due process of law by Illinois' irrebuttable 
statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers are un-
qualified to raise their children. Because of that presump-
tion, the statute required the state, upon the death of the 
mother, to take custody of all children born of parents 
who were not married to each other, without providing 
any hearing on the father's parental fitness. The state 
sought to defend that presumption by the argument "that 
Stanley and all other unmarried fathers can reasonably 
be presumed to be unqualified to raise their children." 
Id. at 653. This Court disagreed: 
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmar-
ried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. 
It may also be that Stanley is such a parent and that 
his children should be placed in other hands. But all 
unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are 
wholly suited to have custody of their children. This 
much the State readily concedes, and nothing in this 
record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglect-
ful father who has not cared for his children. Given 
the opportunity to make his case, Stanley may have 
been seen to be deserving of custody of his offspring. 
Had this been so, the State's statutory policy would 
have been furthered by leaving custody in him. [40 
U.S. at 654-655 (footnote omitted).] 
The irrebuttable presumption established by § 621 c 
the California Evidence Code—that a child born to 
married woman who is cohabiting with her husband i 
the child of the husband unless the latter is impotent o 
sterile—is no more "necessarily or universally true" a 
a factual matter, Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452, than th 
presumptions which were struck down in Stanley an 
Vlandis.™ Nor, given the present day technology o 
blood tests, is the state without "reasonable alternativ 
means," id., for determining the identity of the actus 
father.13 Like the presumption in Stanley, the effect o 
the California statute is to deny the biological fathe 
his liberty interest in "the companionship, care, custodj 
and management" of his child. Stanley, 405 U.S. a 
651. Therefore, under this Court's precedents, it uncon 
stitutionally deprives him of due process of law. 
The conclusive presumption cases do not stand alon 
in requiring this conclusion. By refusing to provide th 
opportunity to establish legally the factual and emotiona 
reality of parental interest, 
12
 See also Cleveland Board of Education V. LaFleur, 414 U i 
632, 644-646 (1974). In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975] 
the Court distinguished Stanley and LaFleur in sustaining th 
constitutionality of the nine-month-duration-of-relationship SOCK 
security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stei 
children of deceased wage earners, "Unlike the claims involved i 
Stanley and LaFleur** said the Court, "a noncontractual claim t 
receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutional! 
protected status." Id. at 771-772 (emphasis added). 
18
 The situation was otherwise when California first codified th 
presumption in 1872 as a rule of expediency based, in part, on th 
impossibility of establishing an absolute determination of nor 
paternity when parentage was disputed. See Comment, "Califoi 
nia's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy: Jackson V. Jackso 
and Evidence Code Section 621", 19 Hastings L.J. 963, 964 (1968) 
4. 
the State has sought not simply to infringe upon that 
interest, but to end it. If the State prevails, it will 
have worked a unique kind of deprivation, [citations 
omitted]. A parent's interest in the accuracy and 
justice of the decision to terminate his or her par-
ental status is, therefore, a commanding one. [Las-
siter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 
27 (1981).] 
In Lassiter, a divided Court held that the Due Process 
Clause does not require the appointment of counsel for 
indigent parents in every parental status termination 
proceeding. The Court subsequently observed, however, 
that "it was 'not disputed [in Lassiter] that state inter-
vention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] 
and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures 
meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.'" 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (quoting 
452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and citing the 
Court's opinion in Lassiter and the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stevens). As the Court added in Santosky: 
The absence of dispute reflected this Court's his-
torical recognition that freedom of personal choice 
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith 
V. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 
(1977) ; Movre V. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 
(1977) (plurality opinion); Cleveland Board of 
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 (1972); 
Prince V. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 
(1925); Meyer V. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923). [455 U.S. at 753.] 
B. The court below did not attempt to support the 
constitutionality of § 621 or its application against Mi-
chael H. on the basis that the presumption, it establishes 
is a reasonable approximation of factual reality. Rather, 
the court below stated that the "conclusive presumption 
is actually a substantive rule of law # * *." J.S. B l l 
(citing Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603, 619, 7 Cal.Rptr. 
129, 140, 354 P.2d 657, 668 (1960) ).14 This characteriza-
tion is in accord with the current view of the California 
Supreme Court. See e.g., Michelle W. V. Ronald W., 39 
Cal.Sd 354, 216 Cal.Rptr. 748, 703 P.2d 88 (1985), ap-
peal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1043 (1986). 
Adhering to Michelle W., the court below proceeded to 
determine whether Michael H.'s (and Victoria D.'s) due 
process claims were valid by purportedly balancing their 
interests against the state interests which § 621 is said 
to serve. In Michelle W., the court had said: 
We have held that the issue of whether section 621 
adequately protects a putative father's interest "must 
be resolved by weighing the competing private and 
state interests." In Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 
408 U.S. 564, 570, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 
548, the high court explained that "a weighing proc-
ess has long been a part of any determination of the 
form of hearing required in particular situations. 
14
 In Kusior, the Supreme Court of California rejected the con-
tention that giving effect to the conclusive presumption of § 621 
"is not consistent with constitutional principles in that there is no 
reasonable relationship between the presumption and the fact 
sought to be presumed in a case in which there is scientific evidence 
to the contrary." The court responded that 
appellant does not suggest that the Legislature has no interest 
in or power to determine, as a matter of overriding social 
policy, that given a certain relationship between the husband 
and wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child. 
There are significant reasons why the integrity of the family 
when husband and wife are living together as such should not 
be impugned. A conclusive presumption is in actuality a sub-
stantive rule of law and cannot be said to be unconstitutional 
unless it transcends such a power of the Legislature. [54 Cal.2d 
at 618-619, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 139-140, 354 P.2d at 667-668.] 
Kusior, which was decided long before Stanley v. Illinois, was a 
suit by the mother to establish paternity in a man other than the 
person who was her husband at the time of conception. 
. . ." (Emphasis in original) [39 Cal. 3d at 360, 
216 Cal.Rptr. at 751, 703 P.2d at 91 (citation 
omitted).] 
However, this Court's decision in Roth does not justify 
the use of a balancing test in determining the constitu-
tionality of § 621 here. For, regardless of the California 
courts' characterization of § 621, the reality is that the 
court below applied the conclusive presumption preclud-
ing Michael from establishing that he is Victoria's father 
"to terminate their relationship." J.S. B14.15 And 
where, as here, the issue is not the form of hearing but 
whether a person is entitled to be heard at all, a balanc-
ing test is not applicable; the only issue is whether or 
not a "liberty" or "property" interest is at stake. If so, 
Roth establishes (as we note at the outset of this part 
of our brief), that the Due Process Clause requires that 
a hearing be held.16 This distinction was carefully articu-
lated in Logan V. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 
(1982): 
As our decisions have emphasized time and again, 
the Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party 
15
 The court below acknowledged that in Michelle W. the Califor-
nia Supreme Court far from applying § 621 to terminate an exist-
ing father-child relationship "left open the validity of section 621 
as applied to a situation where the state is preventing the establish-
ment of a relationship between a putative father and child." J.S. 
B14 (emphasis added). 
16
 The sentence which the California Supreme Court quoted from 
Roth was the beginning of a comparison which reads in full as 
follows: 
[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determina-
tion of the form of hearing required in particular situations 
by procedural due process. But, to determine whether due 
process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not 
to the "weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake. See 
Morrissey v. Brewer, ante, p. 471, at 481. We must look to see 
if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion of liberty and property. [408 U.S. at 570-571 (emphasis in 
original, footnote omitted).] 
the opportunity to present his case and have its 
merits fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism 
that usome form of hearing" is required before the 
owner is finally deprived of a protected property 
interest. Board of Regents V. Roth, 408 U.S., at 
570-571, n.8 (emphasis in original). And that is why 
the Court has stressed that, when a "statutory 
scheme makes liability an important factor in the 
State's determination . . ., the State may not, con-
sistent with due process, eliminate consideration of 
that factor in its prior hearing." Bell V. Burson, 402 
U.S., at 541. To put it as plainly as possible, the 
State may not finally destroy a property interest 
without first giving the putative owner an opportu-
nity to present his claim of entitlement. See id., at 
542. 
On the other hand, the Court has acknowledged 
that the timing and nature of the required hearing 
"will depend on appropriate accommodation of the 
competing interests involved." [455 U.S. at 433-
434 (footnotes omitted).] 
Since it is established that Michael H. and other 
fathers similarly situated do have a liberty interest in 
their father-child relationship, their right to a hearing 
to vindicate that relationship cannot, consistently with 
the requirements of the Due Process Clause, be "balanced" 
away. 
While stating that § 621 declares "a substantive rule 
of law," the court below did not specify what it con-
sidered that rule of law to be. When that rule is 
articulated, however, the sweeping breadth of § 621 as 
construed herein is immediately evident. That rule, 
simply put, is that unwed fathers shall not be recognized 
as such, and shall not enjoy any of the rights of parent-
hood if the mother is married and cohabiting with her 
husband, unless the husband is impotent or sterile, or 
either the husband or the mother (joined by the father) 
chooses otherwise. As the court below understood § 621 
22 
and applied it in this case, that provision overrides the 
father's interest even if he "has established an affection-
ate relationship with [the child] and has at times even 
contributed to her support" J.S. B16. The rule cuts off 
such a father's liberty interest in his relationship with 
his child without a hearing into the circumstances of the 
individual case. It therefore violates the father's rights 
under the Due Process Clause even if it is regarded solely 
as a rule of substantive law. 
It is illuminating in this regard to compare the situ-
ations in Roth and Logan with the operation of § 621. 
Whereas the right to a hearing asserted in the earlier 
cases was based on "property" claims which were de-
pendent on state law,17 appellant's liberty interest is de-
rived directly from the Constitution itself. Thus, the 
state could have adopted legislation which eliminated the 
property right at issue in Logan—a claim under the 
state's Fair Employment Practices Act; it would thereby 
have eliminated any due process right to a hearing on a 
claim of employment discrimination. 455 U.S. at 432-
433. But the state may not simply eradicate a father's 
liberty interest in his relationship with his daughter; it 
likewise may not accomplish the functional equivalent by 
denying him a hearing to vindicate that interest 
The state's interest in "the integrity of the family 
unit," J.S. Bl l , B15-B16, does not validate § 621. As 
we have shown above, the question whether a person has 
a right to some form of hearing to protect the liberty 
interest is not subject to any balancing test. Moreover, 
even if it is viewed as a substantive regulation, § 621 
" S e e Logan, 455 U.S. at 430-431; Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-578. 
In Roth, the Court held that the respondent teacher did not have 
a property right in his continued employment, and therefore con-
cluded that he was not entitled to a hearing concerning his dis-
missal. Cf. Perry V. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-603 (1972). 
Roth also concluded that no liberty interest of the teacher was 
affected. 
may not constitutionally be applied to override a liberi 
interest without a "showing [of] a subordinating intere 
which is compel]ing.,, Cf. Bates V. Little Rock, 361 U. 
516, 524 (1960); Carexj v. Population Services Intern 
tional, 431 U.S. 678, 685-686 (1977). Such a showing-
indeed, even the minimal showing that the state intere 
in family stability would be furthered at all by deprivir 
the father of any relationship with the child—depen< 
on the existence of a stable family relationship betwec 
the mother and her husband. It is, to say the least, f; 
from "necessarily or universally true in fact" ,8 that tl 
family relationship between a husband and his wife 
stable where the mother has a child by another man, ai 
that man, the father, has assumed and exercised r 
sponsibility for the care of the child and established 
personal relationship with him or her. Therefore, t 
Constitution requires that the stability of the family 
established in every case in which it is asserted as 
reason for overriding the father's liberty interest.19 
too, there must be a hearing to determine whether t 
liberty interest and the state interest can be accomn 
dated, for example, by recognizing the true father's p 
ternity and according him visitational rights. Neverth 
less, as construed below, § 621 categorically overrides t 
father's liberty interest in his relationship with 1 
child without regard to what a hearing would show as 
whether the assertedly countervailing state interest 
truly implicated, and if so, how that interest and that 
the father can best be effectuated. 
In disposing of appellant's interests, the court bel< 
observed: "Gerald D. and Carole D. are now living 
gether with Victoria D. and their new baby boy as 
afi
 Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at 452. 
10
 Of course, in those cases where the person who claims pater 
rights has not established such a relationship with the child, h< 
without a constitutionally protected interest, and § 621 may hav 
constitutionally valid field of operation. 
family unit The state's interest in maintaining that 
family is considerable/' J.S. B16. Since federal constitu-
tional rights are involved, that analysis is utterly inade-
quate. To begin with, the court implicitly assumed that 
the present relationship there described is the pertinent 
one for evaluating Michael H.'s rights, and that this re-
lationship is stable. Neither of these assumptions can 
survive constitutional scrutiny.20 
Moreover, the court does not find that the state's in-
terest in "maintaining that family" would be adversely 
affected if Michael H. were to be accorded the benefits of 
fatherhood, or inquire whether the state's asserted in-
terests and those of the appellant can, in some way, be 
accommodated. The Due Process Clause does not permdt 
a court to destroy the father's interest in his relation-
ship with his child without making such a determination, 
and requires that no such determination be made except 
after a hearing directed to that issue. 
The court below further stated that because Carole D. 
and Gerald D., who have custody of Victoria D., oppose 
Michael H.'s action, "there are competing private in-
terests" as to parental relationships with the child. J.S. 
B16-B17 (emphasis added). But these "private interests" 
cannot, by their mere assertion, override the father's 
constitutional interest in his relationship with his daugh-
ter. This is so even though Carole D. also has a liberty 
20
 Apparently because of the perceived requirements of § 621, the 
court ignored the abundant evidence—placed in the record before 
the trial court dismissed the case—which demonstrated the insta-
bility of the D.s' marriage. See Statement pp. 2-5, supra. Yet, 
the court below took note of and was influenced by the birth of a 
son to the D.s shortly before the hearing in that court, an event 
which was announced by the husband's attorney at oral argument. 
We also submit that the Constitution does not permit a father in 
appellant's position to be divested of his interest in the child which 
he has fathered by the circumstance that the mother has produced 
another child with her husband while his parental rights are in 
litigation. 
interest in her relationship with Victoria D. Due proces 
requires that a resolution of these interests be made afte 
a full hearing on all pertinent issues. See especiall 
Armstrong v. Manzo, supra, where the father's due proc 
ess right to a hearing was vindicated despite the opposi 
tion of the child's mother, his former wife. See 380 U.S 
at 546-548. 
A further state interest which the court below identi 
fied as justifying § 621 is that its "rule protects th 
innocent child from the social stigma of illegitimacy, 
J.S. Bl l , and the court invoked that theory in rejectin 
Victoria D.'s due process claim. Id. at B18. We antic] 
pate that Victoria's constitutional position will be full 
presented in the brief of her guardian ad litem; but w 
comment briefly on that portion of the court's decisio 
because, although the court did not expressly advert to th 
"stigma" rationale in deciding against Michael H., i 
appears to have affected the result as to him as wel 
The court relied on the "stigma" theory in determinin 
that the application of § 621 would be in Victoria D. 
welfare, id. at B17-B18, and the court's view as to whs 
was in Victoria's welfare was a factor in its decisio 
against Michael H. as well. Id. at B17. 
We submit that the purported state interest in pre 
tecting Victoria D. against "social stigma" is not tenabl 
even as a makeweight to override the interests of eithe 
appellant herein. To begin with, the Court of Appeal 
rationale is contrary to the most recent apposite decisic 
of the Supreme Court of California, which explicitly n 
jected an argument "that the 'stigma' of illegitimac 
should be considered in determining the constitutional^ 
of section 621." Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal.3 
at 362 n.5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752 n.5, 703 P.2d at 92 n.l 
In any event, this rationale is wholly unsound. Palmm 
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), provides an a] 
analogy. There, the Court reversed a state court decisic 
which had divested a natural mother of the custody < 
her infant child because of her remarriage to a person of 
a different race. The state court had reasoned as follows: 
"This Court feels that despite the strides that have 
been made in bettering relations betiveen the races 
in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will, if 
allowed to remain in her present situation and at-
tains school age and thus Triore vulnerable to peer 
pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that 
is sure to come." [466 U.S. at 431, this Court's 
emphasis.] 
This Court forcefully rejected the notion that a child's 
welfare could be promoted by a court giving constitu-
tional force and effect to private prejudices. 
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and 
ethnic prejudices do not exist or that all manifesta-
tions of those prejudices have been eliminated. * * * 
The question, however, is whether the reality of 
private biases and the possible injury they might in-
flict are permissible considerations for removal of an 
infant child from the custody of its natural mother. 
We have little difficulty concluding that they are not 
The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but 
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give them effect. [466 U.S. at 
433 (footnote omitted).] 
The Court of Appeal's "social stigma" rationale in this 
case is likewise indefensible because it gives effect to the 
private prejudice against illegitimate children. Cf. Pickett 
v. Brmvn, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Hablwetzel, 456 
U.S. 91 (1982); Levy V. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
The Palmore precedent aside, it is almost incredible that 
the court below should have given appreciable weight to 
the "stigmatization" concern in determining that Vic-
toria D.'s interests would be furthered by depriving her 
of the affectionate relationship which she and her father 
have developed. 
The court's determination concerning Victoria D.'s wel-
fare—and the consequent rejection of the appellants' due 
process claims—is constitutionally insupportable for a 
more fundamental reason. That determination was the 
product of the presumption under § 621 rather than a 
hearing addressed to all the circumstances affecting Vic-
toria's welfare. It is, therefore, constitutionally invalid 
under the authority of Stanley v. Illinois, supra. What 
the Court held in Stanley is equally apposite here: 
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and 
easier than individualized determination. But when, 
as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care [or other issue perti-
nent to the child's welfarel, when it explicitly dis-
dains present realities in deference to past formali-
ties, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the 
important interests of both parent and child. It 
therefore cannot stand. [405 U.S. at 656-657.1 
III. The California Statute Violates the Equal Protection 
Clause Because It Invidiously Discriminates Against 
Biological Fathers 
As the Court taught in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
at 651, "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or 
her children 'comefs] to this Court with a momentum 
for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which 
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.' Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)." Therefore, in determining whether 
§ 621 of the California Evidence Code as construed 
and applied herein violates the Equal Protection com-
mand of the Fourteenth Amendment, the operative stand-
ard is that set forth in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 
388 (1978): "When a statutory classification signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamenta 
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by suf 
ficiently important state interests iand is closely tailored 
to effectuate only those interests/' 
Analysis of § 621 under this standard begins by iden-
tifying the classification it creates, and the fundamental 
rights with whose exercise it interferes: California Evi-
dence Code § 621 treats fathers of children whose mother 
is married to and cohabiting with another man (if he is 
not sterile or impotent) differently from other parents. 
By operation of the statute, such a father is denied a 
hearing at which he is given the opportunity to prove 
that he is in fact the biological father of the child, and at 
which he may vindicate his parental rights in his rela-
tionship with the child, and is thereby deprived of his 
legal status as father and of all parental rights. 
In denying the father of a child a hearing in which he 
can assert and vindicate his parental interests, although 
he has exercised his parental responsibility to that child, 
§ 621 is, as we have discussed earlier, indistinguishable 
from the statute which was struck down in Stanley v. 
Illinois. In Stanley, after his children were made wards 
of the state upon their mother's death, the father was 
categorically denied a hearing on his fitness as a parent 
because, as an unwed father, he was conclusively pre-
sumed unfit under the Illinois statute. 405 U.S. at 649-
650. This statutory conclusive presumption, operating to 
deny "a hearing to Stanley and others like him while 
granting it to other Illinois parents," was held to be 
"inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection. Clause." 
Id. at 658. So too, § 621 denies appellant, Michael H., 
and other fathers similarly situated, a hearing in which 
they can establish their paternity and effectuate their 
parental rights. 
Section 621 violates the Equal Protection Clause also 
because it constitutes gender-based discrimination like 
the statute which was struck down in Caban v. Mo-
hammed. In Caban, § 111 of the New York Domestic 
Relations Law required the consent of the mother to t 
adoption of a child born out of wedlock, but did not 
quire the consent of the child's father. 441 U.S. at 3! 
The Court ruled that § 111 was an unconstitutional d 
crimination because it treated unwed fathers and unw 
mothers differently—by allowing the mother an absoh 
veto over the adoption of their children and by not givi 
that same protection to fathers who "may have a re 
tionship * * * fully comparable to that of the mothe 
Id. at 389, 394. The effect of the statute was W 
to discriminate unreasonably between the parents 
making an undifferentiated distinction that bore no "si 
stantial relationship to the State's asserted interests." 
In this case, just as in Caban, § 621 unjustifiably d 
criminates between biological parents. Under its ten 
the right of a biological mother to remain a parent is n 
er open to question without access to a full panoply of c 
process protections. On the other hand, a biological f atl 
is deprived of parental rights without any determinat 
of his fitness and precluded from ever asserting 
parental rights notwithstanding his established relati 
ship with the child. 
Section 621 cannot be sustained on the theory that 
is supported by sufficiently important state interests s 
is narrowly tailored to serve only these interests. ! 
Zablocki, supra. Indeed, with respect to the objecti 
asserted by the court below, it is significantly both o\ 
inclusive and undersinclusive. 
The state's interest in preserving the stability of 
family will be served by § 621 only if the family n 
tionship between the husband and wife and the moth< 
child is in fact stable, because § 621 precludes any he 
ing which challenges the husband's paternity and ther 
cuts off at the threshold any inquiry into the stability 
that family. Thus, § 621 can terminate a father's rig 
without advancing any state interest in family stabil 
With respect to the state's interest in the welfare of 
child, § 621 is actually counterproductive because it ft 
closes a hearing at which the true welfare of the c 
can be determined on the basis of all pertinent consider-
ations—including, for example, whether the child's best 
interests would be "furthered by" preserving its rela-
tionship with its own father. Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 
654-655.21 
Section 621 undermines the state's articulated goal in 
other circumstances as well. For example, if Carole D. 
had divorced Gerald D. after the child's birth, married 
Michael H. and raised the child with ham, § 621 could 
prevent Michael H. from being adjudicated the child's 
father, even if he were the child's natural father as 
well as being the man in her family unit. Gerald would 
be considered the child's legal father and would be 
allowed to participate—in whatever fashion he might 
desire—in the Michael, Carole and Victoria family unit. 
That was the result in Michelle W. v. Ronald W., supra?2 
It is also apparent that § 621 is underinclusive by per-
mitting the disruption of family stability. That provi-
sion authorizes the husband unilaterally, (or the mother, 
together with the unwed father), to raise the question of 
biological paternity. Such an action could be equally dis-
ruptive to family stability as an unwed father's indi-
vidual request to be judicially declared a parent. So too, 
21
 For the reasons stated earlier, we submit that protecting a 
child against the "social stigma" of illegitimacy is not a state 
interest which can be asserted to override parental rights. We note, 
however, that while § 621 is effective to prevent a child from learn-
ing the identity of her true father through the means of a paternity 
hearing, it denies parental rights to all fathers even if the child 
already knows that the man to whom her mother is married is not 
her father. That is likely to be the result in most, if not all, situa-
tions where the real father has developed a relationship with the 
child which is sufficiently close to be a liberty interest under Lehr 
and its antecedents. See Part I, supra. 
22
 In that case, the biological father had not established a rela-
tionship with his child prior to the litigation. See p. 20, n.15, supra. 
Under the interpretation of § 621 by the court below, however, that 
would make no difference. 
§ 621 specifically permits the natural father to bring 
issue either the sterility or the impotence of the husbc' 
The resulting disruption is surely no less than if he v 
to assert his paternity without impugning the husba 
potential to sire a child. It is also clear that the statul 
exceptions were framed without regard to the interest 
the children who would inevitably be affected by 
operation of § 621.M 
Finally, the inclusions and exclusions on the face 
§ 621 take no account whatsoever of the fundamental 
ference between unwed fathers who have demonstr; 
a full commitment to the responsibilities of parentl 
sufficient to vest them with a liberty interest, and o 
unwed fathers, who have developed no relationship v 
and exercised no responsibility whatsoever for the c] 
Rather, it classifies fathers only according to whether 
mother is or is not married and cohabiting with her 
band. Thus, a father like Michael H. is deprived o1 
parental rights without any hearing, whereas nothin 
§ 621 prevents any man who has had a child witf 
unmarried woman from insisting on a hearing to es 
lish his paternity and to assert his parental rights « 
if he has previously taken no interest in the child 
statute which so arbitrarily deprives fathers of 1 
liberty interest "is inescapably contrary to the E 
Protection Clause." Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
23
 We note also, for whatever it may be worth, that each c 
statutory exceptions disserves any interest which the state 
assert in protecting the child against the "stigma" of i 
legitimacy. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I 
IS IT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO 
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF AN UN-
WED FATHER WHO PROMPTLY MANIFESTED A 
SIGNIFICANT PARENTAL INTEREST IN HIS 
CHILD AND WOULD BE A GOOD PARENT SOLELY 
BECAUSE IT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD? 
II 
IS IT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO 
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF AN UN-
WED FATHER WITHOUT A FINDING ADVERSE 
TO HIS PARENTING ABILITY WHEN (A) OTHER 
FATHERS MUST BE FOUND TO HAVE NO INTER-
EST IN OR ABILITY FOR PARENTING BEFORE 
THEY LOSE THEIR RIGHTS, AND (B) UNWED 
MOTHERS DO NOT LOSE THEIR RIGHTS UNDER 
SIMILAR CONDITIONS! 
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OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate District, Division One, which appears in the sep-
arate Appendix submitted herewith, p. la, was reported 
at 191 Cal.App.3d 786, but was ordered not to be published 
in the Official Reports by the California Supreme Court, 
p. 69a. 
The opinion of the California Supreme Court, which 
applied as law of the case, appears in the Appendix, p. 36a, 
held that the "best interests of the child" test applied, and 
was constitutionally sound, and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. I t was reported at 37 Cal.3d 65, as In re 
Baby Girl M. 
o 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
1 
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED 
Edward McNamara appeals from the final judgment 
of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, dated 
April 30, 1987, p. la . The judgment terminated all of his 
parental rights as to a child born out of wedlock, but as to 
which he had proved paternity and sought to raise as his 
own soon after birth, within the statutory time for seeking 
custody. 
The California Supreme Court had previously ruled 
in the case, as law of the case, and the Court of Appeal 
declined to reconsider, that California's custody test of 
"best interests" of the child controlled paternity suit 
1 ¥-
2 
claims by father's seeking to retain their parental rights. 
That test is that a parent is entitled to custody unless cus-
tody with the parent would be detrimental to the child. 
The court also ruled that the best interests/detriment to 
the child test is the constitutional equivalent of proving 
unfitness of the unwed father to have parental rights. 
No appeal was filed previously because the judgment 
terminating parental rights was not final; it was subject 
to the unwed father, appellant, proving he was the best 
person to have custody so he could retain his rights. 
A timely petition for review was denied July 30, 1987, 
and this appeal is being docketed within 90 days of that 
denial. 
2 
STATUTORY BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for appeal is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). 
The California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
ruled that California Civil Code, section 7017, subdivision 
(d), as applied, was not repugnant to the United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV, as it did not deny appellant 
equal protection of the laws or due process of law. 
Appeal jurisdiction lies where the state court has actu-
ally decided that a state statute as applied is not repugnant 
to the United States Constitution. Charleston Fed. S. & 
L. Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185-186 (1945); Ed-
wards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 532, 550-551 (1874); 
accord, Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 18, 22 
(1974); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 
3 
Alternatively, the court should treat the papers as a 
petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2103, and grant the writ. (Rules 17.1 (b) (c) ; cf., Kulko 
v. Superior Court, 43G U.S. 84,90, n. 4 (1978). 
o 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
44No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." 
The pertinent California statutes are in the Civil Code. 
Section 4G00, Appendix, p. 70a, covers child custody in 
general and sections 7004, p. 70a, 7006, p. 71a, and 70 L7, 
p. 72a, are part of the Uniform Parentage Act. 
o — 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Edward's daughter, Katie, was born July 18, 1981. 
He and the mother had dated during the fall of 1980, but 
did not see each other after November. Edward did not 
know of the pregnancy nor of Katie's birth until after 
August 1, 1981. The mother told him after Katie had been 
placed in a foster home. The mother wanted Katie adopted 
by strangers, and she wanted Edward not to have any 
contact with his daughter. 
Not knowing that Katie was to be relinquished for 
adoption, Edward explored possible placements. At first, 
i ~~~..,„> i.rt w i t w n R O n s witU him, he suggested his daugh-
4 
ter be placed with his friends. On August 10th, he learned 
the mother was giving Katie up for adoption. Fearful he 
would never see her again, he asked for custody. 
The statute allowed him 30 days to seek custody and 
assert parentage [Cal. Civil Code, $7017, subd. (d), p. 
72a] He acted well within that time and promptly under 
the circumstances. 
At the initial hearing in December of 1981, the trial 
court found that Edward was the biological father and a 
"good parent [who] can provide a good, loving home for 
the child." But the court found that the best interests of 
the child would be served by giving custody to the prospec-
tive adoptive parents who had cared for her a total of five 
months. It was felt she had "bonded*' with them and could 
not form a relationship with her father. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
unwed fathers, who are not presumed fathers, Cal. Civil 
Code, §7004, sub. (a), p. 70a, are entitled to the parental 
preference presumption, Cal. Civil Code, § 4600, p. 70a. 
Custody may not be awarded to a nonparent unless cus-
tody with a parent would be detrimental to the child, [p. 
39a-42a] The court, however, remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings to determine if the passage of time had 
changed circumstances so that Edward was no longer en-
titled to custody, [p. 50a] 
Further hearing was held in February of 1985. No 
evidence showed Edward other than a good and loving 
parent who can provide a good home. [p. 6a] All paren-
tal rights were terminated, however, because Katie had 
been with the prospective adoptive parents for over four 
years and removing her would be detrimental. The Court 
5 
of Appeal affirmed, finding that there was substantial 
evidence to support the finding of detriment to the child, 
the only issue left open by the California Supreme Court, 
[pp. 6a-7a] 
At all times, Edward has been a good and loving father 
ivlio has manifested significant parental interest. 
Edward sought custody shortly after learning of 
Katie* birth. He has been found to be a good parent. 
At the first hearing, there was no evidence even of 
detriment to the child if removed from the foster parents 
after five months, fp. 49a] The trial court found he was 
a good parent who could provide a loving home. [p. 37a] 
That evidence did not change at the second hearing, 
[p. 6a] Indeed, the trial court encouraged the adoptive 
parents to make Edward part of Katie's life. [p. 5a] 
There is no way to enforce visitation after termination of 
parental rights, of course, and visitation pending appeal 
was denied. There has been no contact since shortly after 
birth. 
Edward is not an unfit parent and promptly acted to 
assert his parental rights and assume his parental duties. 
Katie's birth. 
California applied a best interest test to terminate parental 
rights of an unwed father. 
Under California Civil Code, section 7017, subdivision 
(d), p. 72a, as applied by the California courts, the test 
for terminating parental rights of unwed fathers who are 
not presumed fathers, Cal. Civil Code, § 7004, p. 70a, is 
what is in the best interests of the child, [p. 39a] 
6 
That is the result. There is a parental preference 
which must be overcome by a showing it would be detri-
mental to the child to give custody to the parent, [pp. 48a-
49a] The statute has been amended so that there no longer 
is even that parental preference for fathers not presumed 
fathers. I t now is a straight best interest test. Lp. 13a, 
n. 7] If custody with someone else would be better 
for the child, the father loses, as Edward did. 
The courts rationalized this by saying that the U. S. 
Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, having re-
served the question, [pp. 45a-48a] "The Supreme Court 
has not directly considered a fact situation similar to ours, 
where a mother has relinquished a newborn child and re-
fused the father any contact. Thus the court has not ad-
dressed whether the natural father's parental rights may 
be terminated by only a best interests standard, or if a 
further finding of detriment is required.'' [p. 47a] 
The court refused to hold that a finding of unfitness 
is required or even that the same standards apply to Ed-
ward as apply to other fathers, presumed fathers, which 
includes every one the mother lets have contact. Cal. Civil 
Code, § 7004, p. 70a. Other parents must be found to have 
abandoned the child or otherwise demonstrate an inability 
or lack of interest in their child. Cf., Cal. Civil Code, $ 232. 
The unwed mother's consent to adoption is always re-
quired. Cal. Civil Code, §7017, subil. (d), p. 72a. 
There is a significant difference, too, between loss of 
custody and termination of parental rights. Custody may 
be modified and visitation allowed. Cf., Cal. Civil Code, 
§ 4600. [p. 70a] Even if the foster parents got custody be-
7 
itation the trial court thought he should have and encour-
aged it. Possibly, he could get custody; if not now, later. 
At least he would have a relationship—and still could 
—during childhood and beyond. 
Now those sweet and memorable moments, those irre-
placeable moments, that companionship, are gone forever. 
A parent deprived of parental rights also loses sub-
stantial legal rights: the right to earnings during minority, 
the right to inherit, and the right to be supported in old 
age, if necessary. 
The losses are significant and based solely on the best 
interest test. 
The California Supreme Court ruled that a finding of 
detriment and best interests is the constitutional equivalent 
of a finding of unfitness; at least it will be until this Court 
directs otherwise, [p. 47a] That, of course, is logically 
absurd. One describes the father and the other factors be-
yond his control, having nothing to do with the father. 
After remand, the Court of Appeal believed the con-
stitutional issue was foreclosed by the California Supreme 
Court [p. 6a, n. 2-7a], and the California Supreme Court 
denied review, [p. 68a] 
o 
REASONS QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
ARE SUBSTANTIAL 
I. PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE SUBSTANTIAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
The right to parent one's children has been vindicated 
in a long line of cases. It is a fundamental right. Prince 
8 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The rights of 
natural parents have also been vindicated, even (hough the 
child is born out of wedlock. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248, 257-258 (1983); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
II. THE ISSUE OF TERMINATING PARENTAL 
RIGHTS SOLELY IN THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD HAS BEEN RAISED AND 
RESERVED BY THIS COURT 
As the California Supreme Court observed [p. 45a, 
n .8] , in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394, n. 11 
(1979), this Court noted that a newborn child was not in-
volved. The same case also reserved whether a State is 
"barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a de-
termination that the parent whose rights are being ter-
minated is unfit." Id., at 394, n. 16. 
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, n. 10 (1982) 
however, this Court doubled that a parental right termina-
tion based on the best interests of the child could stand: 
"The Family Court Judge in the present case ex-
pressly refused to terminate petitioner's rights on a 
'non-statutory, no-fault basis.' App. 22-29. Nor is 
it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate 
a parent's rights without showing parental unfitness. 
See Quilloin v. Waleott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 54 L Ed 2d 
511,98 S C t 549 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . . . ' ' 
Other state courts addressing the issue have held un-
constitutional statutes permitting terminations without a 
showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect. 
In re J . P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375[9] (Utah 1982); In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy C, 644 P.2d 150 (Wash.App. 1982). 
Those are California's statutes—old and new versions— 
and they are invalid. 
9 
The question is squarely presented. 
III. A CAPABLE PARENT WHO MANIFESTS 
SUBSTANTIAL PARENTAL INTEREST IS 
ENTITLED TO RETAIN HIS PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 
Edward acted promptly and did everything he could 
to retain his parental rights and get custody—he still is. 
The courts agree that he should have been given custody 
at the original hearing, five months after Katie's birth, 
[pp. 2a, 12a, 18a, 24a, 34a, 49a] It may not be anpro-
priate to give him custody now, immediately, but that is 
no reason to end parental rights or forbid contact. 
"When an unwed father demonstrates a full commit-
ment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'comling] 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his 
interest in personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. 
At that point it may he said that he 'act Is] as a father 
toward his children.' " 
Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 U.S., at 261. 
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972) and 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, n. 10 (1982), (his 
Court held that unwed fathers are entitled to a hearing to 
determine if they are capable parents who have manifested 
a significant parental interest. 
The significance of the biological connection is that 
it offers the natural father an opportunity that no 
other male possesses to develop a relationship with his 
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts 
some measure of responsibility for the child's future, 
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relation-
10 
ship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the 
child's development.M 
Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 U.S., at 2(52. 
At the least, to terminate rights, there ought to be a 
finding there was no significant relationship and that the 
father was not prevented from forming such a relationship. 
See, White, J., dissenting, Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 
U.S., at 271, n. 3. 
Edward was prevented from any relationship by the 
mother and the state agency, the adoption department. He 
proved he is a capable parents and showed significant in-
terest by seeking custody—total responsibility. Still, he 
lost all pareiital rights. His parental opportunity was 
denied despite carrying all his burdens of proof. 
The issue is squarely raised. 
o 
CONCLUSION 
Reserved and significant issues are squarely pre-
sented. The California Supreme Court refused to address 
them until this Court does so expressly, but the statute was 
held valid. The new statute is even more directly a "best 
interests'* test. Probable jurisdiction should be noted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES E. SUTHERLAND 
Counsel for Appellant 
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